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The Mexican Oil Reform: 
Before and After1 
A former director general of Petroleos Mexicanos (Pemex), Adrian Lajous, identified five issues and challenges that would greatly affect Mexico’s position in the oil world. 
They included:
1. The exhaustion of Mexico’s expansive cycle of petroleum 
production, which occurred between 1995 and 2004 and 
has since declined. It could only be moderated through 
great effort in the future;
2. The continuing reduction of proven reserves, the extracted 
deposits accounting for 70 percent of the total, the 
improbability of discovering an amount comparable to them 
in the southeast basin as occurred in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, and the likelihood of current reserves lasting 
for less than ten years on average if current volumes of 
production are sustained;
3. The conversion of Mexico into a substantial importer of 
oil products, in particular petrol, gas and natural gas, with 
the volume in 2009 equivalent to 40 percent of domestic 
gasoline sales, an eighth of natural gas and more than a quarter of liquid gas (LG);
4. A shift in the oil market from a buyers’ to a sellers’ one, which has brought a considerable 
rise in prices and inevitable volatility; and
5. The resurgence and intensification of concern with the security and supply of oil and 
natural gas in oil-consuming countries, aided by factors as diverse as they are ubiquitous.
Together these trends presume a radical transformation in Mexico’s involvement in the global 
oil system and change in Mexico’s economy and oil sector. In the best-case scenario, from being 
an important exporter, the country’s influence will decline over a more or less long period. 
In addition, it is important to consider the concentrated nature of crude oil exports in a single 
market: in 2009 90 percent of Mexican sales were to the US, which constituted 11 percent 
of its total imports. It would be extremely difficult for Mexico to replace the US with other 
markets at a time when the US is not critically dependent on Mexican supplies. However, these 
are considered among the most reliable and Mexico is seen as a trusted supplier, which during 
uncertain times creates strong links and whose change would be costly. On the other hand, 
1 Translated from Spanish by Guy Burton and Karla Ruth Orozco Toledano
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this concentration reduces Mexico’s presence and influence in the 
global hydrocarbons market. Diversifying Mexican exports of crude oil 
has been and is a much easier proposal to suggest than to carry out in 
practice.
The limits to exports could contribute to prioritisation of supplies on 
national security grounds. If the volume of exports are limited by a 
requirement which ensures a sufficient amount of reserves to meet 
predicted national demand over a reasonable time, perhaps 25 years, 
it would generate a strong stimulus for exploration – which has not 
been present during the ten year period of growing oil production and 
in which the average life of proven reserves has declined from 48.8 to 
14.8 years and to less than 10 in 2009.
Oil and natural gas imports place the country as a buyer in the market 
for these products. It would appear that it has opted for those supplies 
that are closest and most easily accessible. Since the mid-2000s one 
can say that it has positioned itself better as an importing country, 
especially in the case of natural gas by exploiting the option of natural 
liquid gas (NLG) from various locations, including across the Pacific.
One may question the logic of, on the one hand, reaffirming Pemex’s 
objective of achieving self-sufficiency in natural gas while at the same 
time announcing proposals to construct regasification plants to import 
low-cost NLG from the Pacific basin. One would have to determine if 
the costs incurred in investing in these plants would be justified as a 
one-off measure if self-sufficiency is reached.
Beyond this particular example, it seems clear that it is necessary to 
revise and adjust the country’s behaviour as a notable importer of 
petrol and natural gas. Would it be able to do so in the medium to 
long-term or could it design a rational and effective substitution policy 
for imports in the oil sector? Would it be possible to reduce the amount 
of imported supplies to Pemex with a national minimum scheme like 
that established by Petrobras? Key questions such as these were not 
addressed in the 2008 oil reform.
In the wide word of oil there occur phenomena both close and distant 
which may affect the Mexican position. Before the very important 
fluctuations in international prices in the second half of the 2000s, 
OPEC had regained influence and had returned to being a key actor 
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in the global oil market. What will be the nature and scope of Mexican cooperation 
with OPEC in its efforts to sustain the price of crude exports, which in the past Mexico 
has not only accompanied but at some times led? Now Mexico faces a clear quid 
pro quo: high prices for crude produce greater export income, but at the same time 
higher spending for oil imports whose prices move in relation to those of crude.
In this period of high nominal prices for crude in the global market, Mexico – more under the 
influence of the Finance Ministry than that of the Energy Ministry or Pemex – has insisted on all 
sorts of caveats and warnings that higher oil prices pose to monetary stability and global economic 
growth. Coming from an exporting country, such warnings may seem somewhat excessive as 
well as unrealistic. Over recent years we have analyzed the reasons for the rise in nominal oil 
prices, which unlike previous decades, has neither led to general inflationary pressures nor 
constrained global economic growth. The global crisis in 2008-09 may be attributed to various 
factors, but not to international oil prices.
PEMEx AND ITS SISTERS
At the beginning of the 21st century, various studies about global oil usually distinguish between 
private transnational corporations (TNCs), known in their golden age as ‘the seven sisters’, and 
the state oil companies (SOCs). The latter’s relative importance has grown, as evident from their 
control over nearly four-fifths of global oil reserves. If Pemex had sisters they would be found 
among these companies.
From an international perspective, Pemex is commonly seen to have lost ground to other oil 
corporations, both private and public: as an integrated oil company – according to the official 
Analysis released in 2008 - Pemex is the eleventh largest in the world. However, this position 
has continually deteriorated in recent years: in 2000 Pemex was the sixth most important oil 
company; in 2004 the ninth, in 2006 the tenth and, in 2007, the eleventh.
This ranking allocates the following indicators to each company: oil reserves and production, 
natural gas reserves and production, refining capacity and the amounts produced and sold. Of 
the 50 most important companies at the end of 2006, 21 were private companies; five had 
minority participation from the public sector; six more had public majority involvement and the 
remaining 18 were completely public. If one takes only the twenty largest, 10 are state-owned, 
three more have public sector involvement and the remaining six are private. Between its sisters, 
the largest SOCs, Pemex occupied fifth place in 2006.
In terms of reserves, in 2006 Pemex occupied ninth place between the SOCs, above the 
SOCs of Algeria (Sonatrach), Malaysia (Petronas), Egypt (Egyptian General Petroleum 
Corporation) and Colombia (Ecopetrol), among others. It is usually considered that 
ownership of reserves translates into an ability to maintain production levels and influence in 
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determining prices. After noting that “currently the top ten reserve 
holders are state monopolies”, a 2007 study by Amy Mayers Jaffe and 
others at Rice University (The International Oil Companies), made the 
following observation:
“The disadvantage of TNCs in relation to SOCs in terms 
of possession of reserves has raised speculation about the 
former. The perspective of the TNCs – and the mergers 
between them – depends on their ability to develop 
gigantic oil and gas fields around the world. In recent years 
the leaders of the important oil producing countries, such 
as Russia, Venezuela and Saudi Arabia, have not favoured 
sharing the exploration and development of their resources 
with those of the TNCs, which have seen their access to 
large existing reserves become very restricted. In some cases, 
especially Venezuela and Russia, the TNCs have experienced 
renationalisation, which recall the 1970s. At the same time 
the SOCs have been at the front of not only recovering 
control of own territories’ resources and income, they are 
also exploring foreign fields, exceeding in some cases the 
TNCs in the development of such resources.“
Another recent study, prepared by Robert Pirog for the US Congress 
(The Role of International Companies in the International Oil Market), 
stresses the different objectives pursued by the public oil companies 
in relation to private ones. In many cases the first pursue “wealth 
redistribution, job creation, general economic development, economic 
and energy security, objectives that may be seen as desirable from 
the point of view of the national government”. However, the report 
suggests that “the United States government can use its political 
influence to encourage countries not to use their national oil to 
reach their governments’ objectives, but instead preferably favour 
commercial practices that maximise revenue streams. In some cases 
a large supply of oil could be used as a condition for commercial and 
assistance agreements.” 
Against these international trends, the 2008 reform proposed that 
Pemex behave like a TNC and serve US interests rather than as a SOC 
and Mexican interests.
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THE REFORM AND ITS PURPOSE
The oil reform proposed in 2008 and approved 
with substantial changes the following year 
constituted a range of proposals designed to 
modify Pemex’s organisation, the aim being 
to promote involvement from both domestic 
and foreign private actors in activities that the 
Constitution and law restrict to the Mexican 
state firm.
To provide a basis for the reform proposal, the 
Mexican government published the official 
Analysis, which had a descriptive focus and 
presented the situation for the organisation 
as a matter of fact and final. It would have 
been more useful if the document had been 
analytical and in addition to presenting reality, 
examined how and why it had arrived at 
this situation. Without this analysis it would 
seem that the deterioration in deposits, the 
fall in levels of production and reserves, the 
lack of refining capacity and other problems 
stressed in the document demonstrate 
imminent doom. As a result the conclusion is 
foregone: what is required is to allow “modern 
and effective measures of collaboration with 
third parties”.
It is noted, for example, that “the hydrocarbon 
reserves have been diminishing since the mid-
1980s”, as if this decline could not be avoided 
or stopped, and assuming the continued fall 
in output of the basins in operation until 
2021, “considering increases in recovery 
rates”. No indication was given of their size, 
the volume of remaining crude deposits, or of 
the possibility of further increasing their use. 
Until this year Mexico has managed to obtain 
1.8 million barrels per day. To replenish and 
maintain the level of 2008 production until 
2021 would require making use of the “deep 
Gulf of Mexico” deposits. Nowhere in the 
Analysis were assumptions about economic 
growth, domestic demand, or export and 
efficient energy performance made clear.
In fact, the official Analysis was overwhelmingly 
geared towards supporting the conclusion that 
“initiating the development of deep waters is 
essential” and of course, the already decided 
upon corollary: “Pemex may need to be 
accompanied by other companies to develop 
various activities with its own money”, an 
expression that concealed the intention of the 
proposed privatisation reform.
The Analysis also stressed the growing 
dependence on foreign refining and expects 
that in 2015 Mexico would have to import 
“almost half” of demand and that in 2027 
“imports would be more than twice the 
level of national production”. Not stated 
are assumptions regarding growth of fuel 
demand, the effects of improved automobile 
efficiency, or the use of alternative energy 
sources. Again, the Analysis is only interested 
in presenting an obvious, simple conclusion: to 
increase refining capacity with private foreign 
investment. Following the reform’s approval at 
the end of 2008 the aim of building a new 
refining plant, - the first in several decades – 
was announced with much fanfare. A year 
and a half later, the tendering process has not 
even begun. To all practical intent, the project 
has been forgotten.
Thus it is paradoxical that the Analysis 
postulates that “the challenge is to do this 
all at the same time: investment to increase 
transmission and storage capacity, reconfigure 
current refineries, to meet the challenge of 
cleaner fuel and the construction of new 
refineries”. The only explanation to account 
43
for the manner of such a challenge is to justify that Pemex requires 
“the support of third parties” to lay down pipelines; the Analysis 
notes “flexibility in contracts” and that Pemex can increase its refining 
capacity “with its own and complementary investment”. In addition, 
it recommends reducing dependence on foreign and imported gas 
and other oil products, replacing one form of external dependency, in 
the construction, operation, installation and maintenance of ducts, in 
favour of private ownership, most probably foreign.
When addressing “problematic finance”, the Analysis suggests that 
Pemex should use “more of its own resources and less debt” and 
to continue to attract “complementary investment” – that is to say, 
foreign resources, as if this could be obtained without any costs, as 
if these investments did not generate profit remittances and other 
returns. No estimate of their size is made.
The Analysis contains two indicators that are not related explicitly: first, 
the total taxes, rights and utilities paid by Pemex (676 billion pesos, 
equivalent to $USD14.65 billion in 2007); and second, the size of oil 
rent, defined as the difference between the value of hydrocarbons 
extracted from the subsoil at international market prices less minus the 
cost of efficient extraction (509 million pesos, equivalent to $USD11 
million in the same year). The latter remains with the state while taking 
away in addition 32.8 percent from the firm’s receipts, an unrecognised 
spoliation and in which a large part of the company’s financial problems 
may be found. For a long time Pemex has been subject to a clearly 
confiscatory tax regime, which has deprived the firm of investment, 
expansion and modernisation opportunities.
It has been stressed often that Pemex would benefit from greater 
autonomy. The Analysis reiterates this point. On the one hand, no 
one would be against more liberalisation for the company against 
the institutional and administrative ties that subject it to the federal 
budget and obsolete regulations concerning the operation of state 
organisations and firms. On the other hand, there is agreement that oil 
rents should not only be extracted from Pemex – which by definition, 
corresponds with the state – but additional sums too. Nevertheless, 
in the various debates and discussions around oil reform the question 
of managerial autonomy has acquired another character, becoming a 
double-edged sword.
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The experience of the last three decades makes it evident that Pemex 
should be saved from the grip that is choking it: confiscatory tax and 
labyrinthine regulation that has subjected it to the government on one 
side and the maze of corruption in which it has been entangled by the 
unions, contractors and other “private” actors on the other. The abusive 
recourse to third parties harms the public interest and has served to benefit 
private firms, which are often the property of government officials. For this 
reason, the prospect of managerial autonomy for Pemex is disturbing. It 
could convert it into a vehicle for private interests that whether openly or 
discretely could appropriate oil rents and make use of them selectively.
AFTER THE REFORM
Since the forced approval of the reform very little has happened. The 
introduction of a new Administration Council – with four professional and 
independent advisers – and the National Commission of Hydrocarbons 
awaits the end of their legal deadline. The CEO who introduced the 
reform was unceremoniously replaced. The project to build a new refinery 
has been largely abandoned. The deterioration in levels of production 
and crude exports has continued as has the rise in oil imports. After the 
reform, Pemex is, in almost every respect, in a worse position than before.
Perhaps this is why – with the support of oil companies or suppliers 
with which they will surely agree – all of Pemex’s substantial activities 
are now open to standard contracts that include private participation, 
going far beyond the provisions of the amended legislation. During the 
bill’s passage there had occurred a legislative debate about the legality of 
such contracts.
Bearing in mind these contracts, an official campaign has begun to attract 
investment and to encourage the involvement of private companies – 
above all foreign ones – in Pemex’s activities. During the Mexican president’s 
official visit to Japan at the start of February 2010, Felipe Calderon spoke 
to businessmen, stressing the reform of the oil industry “extended the 
opportunities for investment with Pemex, through the use of much more 
flexible contracts, which will allow us to increase the production of oil and 
natural gas”. Other officials, such as the energy minister and economy 
minister have offered much more detail over the greater flexibility of 
contracts that Pemex plans to sign with private actors. ■
